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Abstract
In quantitative information flow we say that program Q is “at least as secure as” P just when
the amount of secret information flowing from Q is never more than flows from P , with of course
a suitable quantification of “flow”. This secure-refinement order v is compositional just when
PvQ implies C(P )vC(Q) for any context C, again with a suitable definition of “context”.
Remarkable however is that leaks caused by executing P,Q might not be limited to their
declared variables: they might impact correlated secrets in variables declared and initialised in
some broader context to which P,Q do not refer even implicitly. We call such leaks collateral
because their effect is felt in domains of which (the programmers of) P,Q might be wholly
unaware: our inspiration is the “Dalenius” phenomenon for statistical databases [9, 11].
We show that a proper treatment of these collateral leaks is necessary for a compositional
program semantics for read/write “open” programs. By adapting a recent Hidden-Markov de-
notational model for non-interference security [21, 22], so that it becomes “collateral aware”, we
give techniques and examples (e.g. public-key encryption) to show how collateral leakage can be
calculated and then bounded in its severity.
Keywords and phrases Quantitative information flow, program semantics, secure refinement.
1 Introduction
The problem of information disclosure in the context of statistical databases was formulated
by Dalenius as an ideal privacy goal: “Nothing about an individual should be learnable
from the database that cannot be learned without access to the database” [9]. Later he
argued the infeasibility of such a strict goal; more recently Dwork [11] addressed the same
concern demonstrating that whenever there is a (known) correlation between two pieces
of information, anything learned about one piece implies that something might also be
learned about the other. In secure programming generally, i.e. not only read-only databases,
this corresponds to leaking information about a secret “high-level” variable X, which then
consequentially leaks information about a different high-level variable Z that does not appear
in the program at all, but is known via “auxiliary information” to be correlated with the
initial value of X. Because of the generality of this programming-language perspective, we
call this effect collateral leakage.
Here we study this broader phenomenon of collateral leakage in the general setting of
read/write programs operating as “open systems”. Because [1] studied Dalenius leakage
in terms of abstract channels (read-only programs), and [22] explored the semantics of
information flow for read/write programs operating as “closed systems” without external
correlation, this work can be see as bringing the two together: we compute general bounds
on collateral leakage for read/write open systems, and we adapt our earlier fully abstract
program semantics to treat it compositionally.
The following “password” example helps to illustrate the issues.
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2 Compositional security and collateral leakage
// Password X is initially uniformly distributed over X = {A, B, C}.
“Lax” user
X:∈ [A,B,C] ∗
leak [X+,X−] †
“Strict” user
X:∈ [X+,X−] $
leak [X+,X−] †
∗ [...] is the uniform distribution over {...}; and X:∈ assigns to X from a distribution.
$ X+ is the letter following X in X (wrapping around), and X− the preceding.
† leak [X+,X−] makes a (fair) choice secretly between X+ or X−, then emits the value somehow:
it does not however indicate whether it chose X+ or X− to leak.
Note that the X referred to in the leak statement is the updated value, after the X:∈ update.
Lax may choose any new password, uniformly, including his current; but Strict must change his
password, again uniformly. In both cases the distribution of the new X is again uniform: for Lax it is
independent of X’s initial value; but for Strict is is correlated. Both users, in the second statement †,
suffer an “over the shoulder” attack against the new password.
These programs, although presented informally here, have a precise denotation in the model of [22]:
this example is not relying on informality.
Figure 1 Updating a password
1.1 Changing a password: is it only “fresh”, or actually “different”?
Consider the situation in Fig. 1 with state space a set {A,B,C} of just three possible one-letter
passwords (to keep things simple); we assume the distribution of passwords is known, and
(again for simplicity) we assume it’s uniform. Now contrast two users’ behaviours when forced
to change their passwords: User Lax makes a fresh, uniform choice of password; User Strict
however is forced to choose a different password, still uniformly but not the one he already
has. In Fig. 1 both users then suffer an “over the shoulder” attack where the adversary
glimpses a letter the user did not type as he logged-in with his new password.
Although it’s common to consider leaks wrt. initial values, especially e.g. for channels
that don’t update any state anyway, in Fig. 1 instead it’s very natural to focus on the final
state of these two programs, i.e. the new password: the old password is not so interesting to
the shoulder-cruiser. This “focus on final” obtains for the theory as well, but for a different
reason: our aim (in program semantics) is to integrate security “correctness” with (ordinary)
functional correctness of programs, i.e. to treat the two within the same framework [22]; and
since functional correctness (and correctness comparisons, i.e. refinement [24]) is determined
wrt. the final values a program produces, we should do the same for security correctness:
more is said about this in §5.3 and its associated App. G.
The example above was deliberately constructed so that the two programs have the same
final distribution: with our assumption of uniformly distributed passwords beforehand, in
both cases (Lax,Strict) the new password’s distribution will be uniform too. Furthermore,
the effect of the leak statement is also the same: the adversary has the same knowledge
about the new password in both cases — he knows exactly one value that it is not. So are
these programs equivalent in terms of their functional- and information-flow behaviour?
The answer depends on the context of operation. As closed systems with a single secret
X, they are indeed equivalent when the initial distribution is uniform.1 But they are not
equivalent if we consider correlations between the final value of X, the new password, and some
1 Complex examples can give equivalence for all initial distributions; but this simple case makes our point.
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other variable, call it Z, even though Z is not mentioned in either program. That is because to
any adversary aware of that correlation, the first program will leak information about Z but
the second will not: for example, if it is known that each user has the same password for their
Facebook (X) and Twitter (Z) accounts, then the over-the-shoulder attack against Strict’s
new password leaks information about his (unchanged) Twitter password even though his
program does not access Twitter at all. 2 This is essentially the Delanius scenario presented
in a programming-language context where X is the statistical database and the correlation
with Z is “auxiliary information” [11] except that, unlike in the traditional presentation, ours
here allows the “database” (the password) to be updated. In this programming context, we
call Z a collateral variable, and information flow from it is collateral leakage.
The Dalenius phenomenon, so well known in security research, is truly remarkable
as collateral leakage in rigorous reasoning about programs: what kind of algebra would
invalidate an equality because of variables not occurring in either formula? In Fig. 1 are two
sequential programs whose treatment of all variables they mention (X) is the same in terms
of assignments to those variables and leaks about them; yet the two programs are not the
same if collateral variables must be considered, variables the program does not even mention.
In a collateral-enabled context, the semantics of Lax and of Strict must differ.3
1.2 Our contributions
1. We extend our channel-based results from [1], based effectively on read-only programs, to
show that even read/write programs’ collateral leakage can be bounded without knowing
what the collateral variables might be (§3),
2. and that the bounds can be used in practice, e.g. in cryptography (§4).
3. We explain the connection between collateral leakage and compositional semantics for
secure programs: that the “problems” with collateral leakage, in both informal (Dalenius)
and rigorous (program semantics) settings, are the same (§5.1).
4. We sketch how to extend our treatment of abstract channels [23] and abstract Hidden
Markov Models [22] to construct fully abstract collateral-aware program semantics (§5.2).
5. We justify for our strong secure-refinement order, by reducing it to the simpler Bayes
vulnerability [26] tests in a collateral context (§5.3).
In (§2) we provide the background for our contributions. Full proofs are in the appendix.
Notation is introduced as needed, with a full glossary for reference in App. A.
2 Abstract information flow: channels, hypers, vulnerability
2.1 Abstract semantics of channels, based on hyper-distributions
Given set X of inputs and Y of observations, a channel between X and Y is a (stochastic)
matrix whose X -indexed rows sum to 1. We write the type of such channels/matrices as
X_Y and for C:X_Y its constituents are elements Cx,y at row x and column y that gives
the conditional probability of output y from input x, the x’th row Cx,− and the y’th column
C−,y. For any set S we write DS for the set of discrete distributions on S; thus for example
2 It’s interesting to reflect that many IT departments might impose Strict’s policy; but it’s his Twitter
account that is at risk, not Lax’s.
3 A more extreme example of this is the two programs X:= 0 and leak X; X:= 0 where both programs
simply set X to 0 and so an adversary, knowing the code, knows also that X will finally be 0. Yet the
second program can reveal something about a collateral Z, while the first cannot.
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any row Cx,− of C:X_Y can be interpreted as an element of DY. Similarly the X×Y
matrix-subtype X^Y is co-stochastic, a channel from Y to X with 1-summing columns.
Following [23, 2] an abstract channel is a function DX→D2X from a prior distribution on
X , i.e. of type DX , to a distribution of distributions-on-X , thus of type D(DX ), equivalently
D2X . That latter is the type of hyper-distributions on X , or “hypers” for short. To do that, we
form the joint distribution induced by the prior and the channel, but then abstract from the
observations’ values y:Y , retaining only the effect they have on our a-posteriori, i.e. Bayesian
reasoning that revises the prior. The support of the hyper is the set of posterior distributions
induced on the prior by each possible observed value y:Y, and the probability assigned by
the hyper to each such posterior, i.e. each element of its support, is the (marginal) probability
associated with the observation y that induced it. In more detail — given a channel C:X_Y
and prior pi:X , the resulting hyper ∆:D2X is found by: constructing the joint distribution
J :D(X×Y) given by Jx,y:=pixCx,y; then for each y the column J−,y normalising4 to give
the posterior induced on pi by that y; and finally taking for the probability assigned to that
posterior the normalising factor. We write pi〉C for the joint distribution J and [−] for the
abstraction from y, so that ∆ = [pi〉C] describes the whole hyper-construction procedure.
As an example, in Fig. 1 above the statement leak [X+,X−] acts, as a channel, by taking
the (initial, and uniform) prior [A,B,C] produced by the assignment statement just before
to the final hyper [ [B,C], [C,A], [A,B] ] where each of the posterior distributions is uniform
(over two values), and the hyper itself is a uniform distribution on the three of them. An
adversary does not know beforehand which two values afterwards he will know are possible;
afterwards he does know the two possibiities, but still does not know which is right.5
2.2 Vulnerabliity induced by gain-functions
Vulnerability [2] is a generalisation of entropy (of distributions), no longer necessarily e.g.
Shannon but now others more adapted for secure programming, and whose great variety
allows fine-grained control of the significance of the information that might be leaked [2, 3].
Given a state-space X , vulnerability is induced by a gain function over that space,
typically g of type GWX =W→X→R, for some space of choices w:W . When W is obvious
from context, or unimportant, we will omit it and write just g:GX . Given g and w (but
not yet x) the function g.w is of type X→R 6 and can thus be regarded as a random variable
on X . As such, it has an expected value on any distribution pi over X , written Epi g.w.7
Once we have x, the (scalar) value g.w.x is simply of type R and represents the gain to
an adversary if he guesses w when the secret’s actual value is x. This suggests that W should
simply be X , i.e. that there would be no point in guessing a w that was not in X , and indeed
a particularly simple example is W=X with g.w.x = (1 if w=x else 0) so that the adversary
gains 1 if he guesses correctly and 0 otherwise: we call this particular gain-function gid.
However for reasons explored thoroughly elsewhere [2, 23], there are practical advantages to
allowing W to be more general. And a theoretical benefit is that it is the more general W’s
that allow representation of many conventional entropy functions (including even Shannon,
after some encoding), thus bringing them all within the same framework [23].
4 If several distinct y’s produce the same posterior, they are amalgamated; if there is y with zero marginal
probability, it and its (undefined) posterior are omitted.
5 The first is an “unknown known” and the second is a “known unknown”.
6 We write dot for function application, left associative, so that function g applied to argument w is g.w
and then g.w.x is (g.w) applied to x, that is using the Currying technique of functional programming.
This convention reduces clutter of parentheses, as we see later.
7 In general we write Epi f for the expected value of function f :X→R on distribution pi:DX.
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A gain function g:GX induces a g-vulnerability function Vg:DX→R so that Vg[pi] for
Π:DX is the maximum over all choices w:W of the expected value of g.w on pi, that is
maxw(Epi g.w). In the simple 1-or-0 case above, the vulnerability Vgid is called the Bayes
vulnerability, sometimes written just V ; it is one-minus the Bayes-Risk of Decision Theory.
Vulnerability applies also to hypers, so that Vg∆ for ∆:D2X is the expected value of
Vg over ∆, itself considered as a distribution on DX . That allows us to write the succinct
Vg[pi〉C] for the a posteriori g-vulnerability of prior pi through channel C.8
2.3 (Classical) Gain-function leakage and capacity for channels
In general, information leakage on prior pi due to channel C is a comparison between the
“information content” of prior knowledge about pi, and of posterior knowledge after observing
C’s output; in particular, its precise definition depends on how the information is measured.
Here we will use gain functions and speak of g-leakage (rather than e.g. the more specific
Shannon leakage). The multiplicative g-leakage of C wrt prior pi and gain function g is the
(log2 of the) ratio between the posterior and prior g-vulnerabilities:
Lg(pi,C) := lg(Vg[pi〉C] / Vg[pi] ) . (1)
The capacity of a channel is the supremum of that leakage (1), but varying in its definition
depending on whether the supremum is over either gain functions, or priors or both:
L∀(pi,C) := sup
g
Lg(pi,C) , Lg(∀, C) := sup
pi
Lg(pi,C) , L∀(∀, C) := sup
pi,g
Lg(pi,C) .
Remarkably, it can be shown that L∀(∀, C) equals Lgid(∀, C) (“min-capacity”): it is the most
robust estimation of leakage, and can always be achieved for some scenario and prior [2].
2.4 Collateral Gain-function leakage and capacity for channels
The Z-collateral leakage of a channel C:X_Y is with respect to some third space Z and
is induced by knowledge of a correlation between values in X and Z.9 We write X,Y,Z of
resp. types X ,Y,Z equivalently for random- or program variables, depending on context.
We assume a known correlation between X and a fresh secret Z given by a joint probability
distribution Π:D(Z×X ) so that leaks about X through (a computer program implementing)
channel C induce “collateral” leaks about Z as follows. Define ↼pi to be the Z-marginal of Π
and determine some channel
⇒
Π in Z_X so that Π = ↼pi〉⇒Π: this factors Π into its marginal
and a conditional.10 Then the matrix multiplication
⇒
Π·C gives a channel D (for Delanius) of
type Z_Y , and the collateral leakage of C is the ordinary leakage of D, calculated as at (1)
above. (The (matrix) multiplication
⇒
Π·C is the channel cascade of ⇒Π and C.)
The Z/Π-collateral capacity of channel C is then the upper bound of the above with
respect to all gain functions, that is L∀(↼pi,
⇒
Π·C). The collateral capacity of channel C in
general is then taken over all possible Z and Π.
8 Recalling that [−] around a list of one element makes the point distribution on that element, we can
regard Vg[pi] as the expected value of Vg on the point hyper on pi, agreeing with our usage just above.
9 In Dalenius terms X is the statistical database, with queries of type Y, and the correlation between X
and Z is auxiliary information [11].
10Recall that Πz,x is thus ↼piz
⇒
Πz,x. Unless marginal ↼pi is full support, conditional
⇒
Π is not unique. But it
does not matter: any choice suffices, and does not affect the outcome.
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3 Collateral gain-function leakage and capacity for HMM’s
3.1 HMM’s as models for leaking probabilistic programs
The discussion in §2, for channels only, corresponds to considering read-only programs. With
Hidden Markov Models we combine channels and Markov transitions between initial- and final
states (e.g. over variables X in X ), thus modelling read/write programs; and the constructions
of §2 carry over. A Markov transition is described by a matrix M say so that Mx,x′ is the
probability that initial state x will result in final state x′. An HMM-step then comprises
a channel and a transition together, but acting independently on the initial state: we call
C its channel and M markov (lower case), and write it (C:M) of type X _ Y×X . Defined
(C:M)x,y,x′ = Cx,yMx,x′ , it is a single stochastic matrix with rows X and columns Y×X .
HMM -steps have the special characteristic that their C and M effects (i.e. output values
y, x′) are independent (uncorrelated) for each separate input-value x; but two steps, say H1,2
of the same type X _ Y×X can be sequentially composed to give a single HMM again: this
is natural if we are using them to model programs. The composed type is the X _ Y2×X
that takes initial state x to final state x′ via some intermediate state x′′, leaking information
(y1, y2) –as it goes– gradually into the set Y2. We define
(H1;H2)x,(y1,y2),x′ =
∑
x′′
H1x,y1,x′′H
2
x′′,y2,x′ , (2)
and note that it is again stochastic, but no longer necessarily a step — its outputs y2 and x′
might be correlated even for a single input x. Because of that, sequential compositions are
strictly more general than the HMM -steps built directly from (C:M) — that is, for C1,2,M1,2
in general there is not necessarily a single C,M such that (C1:M1); (C2:M2) = (C:M). In
App. E we give some elementary properties of HMM -steps, showing in particular how the
different encodings of markovs and channels preserve their different purposes and allows the
same definition of sequential composition to be used for both.
More generally, two HMM ’s over the same state X but distinct observation spaces Y1,2
can be composed as just above; in that case the composite observation space is Y1×Y2,
and that is what allows us to use them for modelling programs which, in general, are not
simply just a fixed sequence of assignment statements. A monadic account of this generality,
including loops and conditionals, is given in [21].
3.2 The induced channel of an HMM
Recall that an HMM of type X _ Y×X takes an initial state in X to a final state (also)
in X and leaks observations in Y along the way, where “along the way” is more general
than channels: in Fig. 1 for example the leak statement occurred after a Markov update.
Collateral leakage however, as we saw in the previous section, is with respect to a value Z
which the HMM (or program) does not even mention: it neither reads nor updates it; the
programmer has never even heard of it. But it is somehow correlated with the initial state:
that being so, we show how to isolate the channel part of an HMM, combining all its leaks
and ignoring its final state. Fix H as some HMM of type X _ Y×X below.
I Definition 1. The effective channel of H, written chn.H, is a stochastic matrix of type
X_Y and defined simply by ignoring the final state: thus (chn.H)x,y:= ∑x′ Hxyx′ .
I Definition 2. The collateral leakage resp. capacity of H wrt a prior Π:D(Z×X ) is the
collateral leakage resp. capacity of
⇒
Π·chn.H. (This is well-defined, though ⇒Π is not unique.)
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The simplicity of Defns. 1,2 conceals that it can be difficult in practice to calculate the
collateral leakage of an HMM, since Def. 1 mandates calculating the whole H first, only then
abstracting from its final state. Yet if H is expressed as a sequential composition of many
smaller ones, e.g. we have H = H1;H2; · · · ;HN , still the final states of the intermediate Hn’s
must be retained, not only to form the composition, but because the overall y observation
from H comprises all the smaller observations y1 · · · yN with each yn+1 being determined by
the final state (x′)n of the Hn just before — we can abstract only at the very end.
In the special case however where each Hn is an HMM -step (Cn:Mn), the calculation of
the effective channel can be somewhat decomposed.
I Lemma 3. Let H be an HMM and (C:M) an HMM-step. Then [proof in App. C]
chn. (C:M) = C
chn. ((C:M);H) = C ‖ (M ·chn.H)
where in general (C1‖C2)x,(y1,y2) = C1x,y1C2x,y2 is parallel composition of channels. The M
cannot be discarded, since it affects the prior of the “tail” H of the sequential composition.
Even with Lem. 3, in general chn.H can be challenging to compute because its size (given by
the number of columns in the stochastic matrix representation) grows exponentially with the
number of single-step HMM ’s, in the definition of H, that have non-trivial channel portions.
We give an example of such a calculation in §4 (fast exponentiation for cryptography).
On the other hand, if we want to compute only the collateral capacity, we can obtain at
least an upper bound at considerably less cost, without the need to compute chn.H exactly.
The following provides an upper bound for L∀(∀, chn.H), and requires only linear resources.
I Lemma 4. For any H let CCap.H be defined [proof in App. C]
CCap. (C:M) = L∀(∀, C) if H=(C:M)
CCap. ((C:M);H ′) = L∀(∀, C) + min(L∀(∀,M),CCap.H ′) if H=(C:M);H ′
Then L∀(∀, chn.H) ≤ CCap.H with the stochastic matrix M (on rhs) treated as a channel.
In fact Lem. 4 provides a very robust estimate of the collateral capacity of an HMM,
since it does not mention Z or the correlating Π. And it is the best possible general bound,
achieving equality for some examples, e.g. Fig. 1. It is also easy to calculate since for any
channel we have from [2] that L∀(∀, C) = Lgid(ΥX , C), where ΥX is the uniform prior on X .
On the other hand, the bound can be very conservative; we provide an example in App. C.
In cases where we know the correlation Π (and thus Z), we can compute the collateral
capacity by identifying the gain function that achieves the extremal value in Def. 2.
I Theorem 5. Given H and Π:D(Z×X ) with ↼pi,⇀pi resp. the marginals [proof in App. C]
of Π on Z,X ; define conditional ⇒Π as in §2.4. There exists gˆ:GZZ and gˆΠ:GZX such that
L∀(↼pi,
⇒
Π·chn.H) = Lgˆ(↼pi,
⇒
Π·chn.H) = LgˆΠ(⇀pi, chn.H) .
This shows that it is possible to construct the gain-function that maximizes the collateral
capacity, and allows its exact calculation. Moreover, it also shows that the collateral capacity
of H wrt. Z can be understood as regular g-leakage of H wrt. the initial state of X .
The next theorem is more general, and gives an upper bound over all possible correlations:
it is determined by the extremal leakage of the initial prior pi:DX , thus easy to calculate [1].
I Theorem 6. Given H and Π as above, ΥX is uniform on X , then [proof in App. C]
L∀(↼pi,
⇒
Π·chn.H) ≤ Lgid(ΥX , chn.H) , where ↼pi,
⇒
Π are as defined in Thm. 5.
8 Compositional security and collateral leakage
// B for base, the cleartext; E for exponent, the key: precondition is B,E >= 0,0 .
// P for power, the ciphertext.
P:= 1
while E!=0 // Invariant is P*(B^E) = be, where b, e are initial values of B,E .
D:∈ [2,3,5] // D for divisor; uniform choice from {2,3,5}.
R:= E mod D; // R for remainder.
if R!=0 then P:= P*B^R fi // Side-channel : is E divisible exactly by D ?
B:= B^D // D is small: assume no side-channel here.
E:= E div D // State update of E here. (No side-channel.)
end
// Now P=be and E=0: but what has an adversary learned about the initial e ?
Although our state comprises B,E,P,D,R we concentrate only on the secrecy of E. In particular, we are
not trying to discover B or P in this case; and D,R are of no external significance afterwards anyway.
Figure 2 Defence against side channel analysis in exponentiation
Note that when X,Z are completely correlated, i.e. when
⇐
Π and
⇒
Π are both the identity, the
inequality in Thm. 6 becomes equality.
4 Example: Collateral damage from leaky cryptography
Keys for public-key cryptography are best if independent; but recently [17] discovered an
unexpected sharing of the prime numbers used to generate them. Thus information leaked
while using one secret key to encrypt a message, even if the message itself remains secure,
could cause collateral leakage wrt. some other key elsewhere and so put future encryptions
at risk — even if they are at another site apparently having no connection to the first. That
motivates our example here, the collateral leakage from a fast-exponentiation algorithm.
Fig. 2 implements fast exponentiation with a random choice of divisor that defends
against a side channel that leaks program flow (of a conditional) [28]. Since the program
code is public, that leak is effectively of whether divisor D exactly divides the current value
of E, which value is steadily decreased by the update at the end of each iteration: thus
additional information is leaked every time. In the standard (and fastest) algorithm the
divisor D is always 2, but that ultimately leaks E’s initial value exactly, one bit (literally)
on each iteration. The final value of E is always zero, of no significance; but its initial value
represents collateral leakage about subsequent use of this same key (obviously), but also the
use of other apparently unrelated keys elsewhere [17]. The obfuscating defence is to vary the
choice of D unpredictably from one iteration to the next, choosing it secretly from some set
D, here {2, 3, 5} although other options are possible. The divisor D itself is not leaked.
We modelled the loop as a sequential composition of HMM -steps for a fixed number of
iterations and used Lem. 3 to construct a channel that captures the leakage of information
about the initial state of the program. Although our calculation is wrt. the uniform prior
on E, and even though we do not know the extent of any correlation between this key E
and others used elsewhere, by using the “Miracle Theorem” [2, Thm 5.1], we can bound
the maximum leakage about the initial value of E with the min-capacity of such a channel.
Furthermore, by relying on Thm. 6 we can see that this min-capacity can also be used as a
bound on the collateral leakage with respect to any other secret that might be correlated to E.
Detailed calculations are in App. D. Our Tbl. 1 confirms that the larger the divisor set
D, the less effective is the side channel; and the protection is increased with more bits for E.
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Size of E D={2} D={2, 3} D={2, 3, 5}
4 bits 4 2.80 2.22
5 bits 5 3.32 2.61
6 bits 6 3.83 2.92
7 bits 7 4.34 3.21
8 bits 8 4.88 3.51
Note that in the case D={2}
the whole secret E is leaked.
As explained at end §2.3, that
Lgid gives the upper bound L∀
for all vulnerabilities.
Table 1 Collateral leakage Lgid(∀,Prog) in bits wrt E for different D’s, for Prog given at Fig. 2.
5 The abstract semantics of “collateral aware” HMM’s
5.1 Bits-leaked vs. a partial order on information-flow
We now contrast our practical example in §4, just above, with our earlier treatment of
passwords, in particular our description (at the end of §2.1) of leakage abstractly as a
hyper-distribution rather than as a number of bits (Tbl. 1).
Both password programs take prior [A,B,C] to the hyper [ [B,C], [C,A], [A,B] ] on the
final state, as we saw in §2.1. But for collateral leakage we must consider (also) the initial †
state: and here the two programs differ. The hyper representing our knowledge of the prior
distribution of the initial password, after execution of Lax, is still [ [A,B,C] ] — it expresses
that we know for sure (point hyper [ [· · ·] ]) that the distribution of X is uniform ([A,B,C]),
that we have learned nothing (more) about the distribution of the password initially. But for
program Strict the hyper describing our revised knowledge about the initial password is
[ [A@1/2,B@1/4,C@1/4], [B@1/2,C@1/4,A@1/4], [C@1/2,A@1/4,B@1/4] ] , (3)
now a uniform hyper over three, different, skewed inners: the first [A@1/2,B@1/4,C@1/4], for
example, is the distribution A wprob (with probability) 1/2 and B,C wprob 1/4 each.11 An
adversary, knowing the program text of Strict and having calculated this hyper would conclude
that, with probability 1/3 each, he can after the run of the program revise his knowledge of
the initial-password distributions from uniform to one of these three skewed inners (although
he does not know beforehand which one of those three possible revisions will eventuate).
Abstracting from any particular vulnerability (or entropy), we conclude that although
Lax and Strict are equivalent wrt their setting and security of the new password when the
previous password was uniformly distributed (§1.1), wrt collateral security Strict is less secure
than Lax. This abstract conclusion, i.e. reached without calculating specifics of “number
of bits leaked”, comes from the “no less secure than” partial order (v) on hypers D2X
where indeed (3) < [ [A,B,C] ], that is the lhs-hyper is strictly less secure than the rhs-hyper
[19, 2, 21, 1, 23, 22]. The significance is that the theory associated with (v) shows that for
any hypers ∆1,2 we have ∆1 v ∆2 exactly when Vg(∆1) ≥ Vg(∆2) for all gain-functions
g: increased security corresponds to decreased vulnerability [1]. Since gain functions can
express not only Bayes Vulnerability but also Shannon entropy (with some encoding) and
many other entropies besides, that is a very strong result: for any “favourite entropy” you
might use to compare the security of two programs, if it is expressible as Vg for some g (no
matter how bizarre) then you will find the former at least as secure as the latter.
11The details of calculating this hyper are given in App. B. Intuitively, whichever (final) not-password is
seen by the adversary, it is more than uniformly probable that the initial password was that since, by
Strict’s policy, the old password cannot be the new password that the adversary did not see.
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For example, the Shannon entropy of [ [A,B,C] ] is lg 3 ≈ 1.58; of (3) it is 1/2·1 + 1/4·2 +
1/2·2 = 1.5. (Decreasing Shannon entropy indicates increasing vulnerability.) And the Bayes
Vulnerability of [ [A,B,C] ] is 1/3; of (3) it is 2/3, increasing as expected.
5.2 Collateral-aware fully-abstract semantics of HMM’s
All proofs for this section are to be found in App. F.
We saw in §2.1 an abstract semantics for (read only) channels in DX→D2X ; we could
summarise that by writing [[C]].pi = [pi〉C], that is that [[−]] is the semantic function that
takes a channel matrix in X _ Y×X to a function as just above. For HMM ’s we do similar:
I Definition 7. Given H:X _Y×X its denotation in DX_D2(X×X ′) takes prior pi to the
hyper [pi〉H] where for hypers (generalising channels) we define (pi〉H)x,y,x′ = pixHx,y,x′ , and
using Y-abstraction now (effectively) on Y×(X×X ′) we obtain a hyper in D2(X×X ′). (The
state-spaces X and X ′ are the same: we use the prime only to distinguish final and initial.)
We write [[H]] for the resulting function, and call those [[·]]-images abstract HMM’s.
Def. 7 extends our earlier definition of HMM -semantics [22] by retaining the initial state, so
that we can account for collateral effects.12 This new type is the bottom arrow of Fig. 3.
For any abstract HMM h and any collateral type Z we can then define a “Z-lifted”
function hZ :D(Z×X )→D2(Z×X ′) that takes a collateral correlation Π:D(Z×X ) to a hyper
in D2(Z×X ′) based on such correlations: this is the top arrow of Fig. 3. We then have
I Definition 8. For abstract HMM ’s h1,2 define h1;h2 to be h1;hX2 where (bold) ; is forward
Kleisli composition on the (larger) state space X×X ′, as used for monadic HMM ’s [22], and
−X is as in Fig. 3 but taking Z to be X . (Recall that X and X ′ are the same.) It satisfies
the essential property that [[H1;H2]] = [[H1]];[[H2]] (Lem. 13).
Vulnerabilities Vg are similarly extended, now taking g:W→(X×X ′)→R, i.e. referring to
both initial and final states. With them, we define secure refinement for HMM ’s, that h1vh2
just when Vg(h1.pi) ≥ Vg(h2.pi) for all such g’s and pi:DX ; and behavioural equivalence to be
refinement in both directions. We say that (concrete) HMM ’s are behaviourally equivalent
just when their (abstract) denotations are. Because refinement v is anti-symmetric [19, 1]
that establishes full abstraction of [[·]] for that equivalence on concrete HMM ’s. A basic
compositionality result is then that Def. 8 respects this equivalence (Thm. 14).
A second basic compositionality result concerns state extension: an HMM acting on
state X , i.e. on a single variable X, can be also considered to be acting on part of a larger
state Z×X with an extra Z (whether correlated or not). Even if the program does not
read or write Z, it nevertheless can release information about Z: this is the essence of the
collateral “problem”. The two programs leak X; X:= 0 and simply X:= 0 make it clear
that the final-state semantics is insufficient for the extension: those two programs both take
any pi:DX to the same final hyper [ [0] ], that X is “certainly 0”. Yet in the context X := Z; (−)
they are different: one reveals Z and the other does not.
I Definition 9. Given abstract h we define its Z extension h×Z :D(Z×X ) → D2(Z×X )2
in two steps.13 First, we construct hX×Z2 as in Fig. 3 to produce function a function of
type D(Z2×X 2)→ D2(Z×X )2 that carries the initial value of X as well as two copies of Z.
12Our earlier domain was DX_D2X , as is still the case for channels since do not update their state.
13We now drop the X ′ primes, to reduce clutter.
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At left: Given a collateral correlation Π:D(Z×X ) let the induced collateral channel Z:Z^X and
X -prior pi:DX be such that Π = Z 〈pi, that is so that Πz,x = Zz,xpix.
At right (in grey): For an initial/fi-
nal distribution δ:D(X×X ′), the left-
multiplication Z·δ produces a distri-
bution in D(Z×X ′), just as matrix
multiplication would.
At right (in black): The D-lifting
(push forward) of the multiplication
(Z·) thus takes an initial-final hyper in
D2(X×X ′) to a hyper in D2(Z×X ′).DX
abstract HMM h- D(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
D(X×X ′) )
Z 〈·
6
Z· 
 
D(Z·)
6
D(Z×X ) h
Z
-
D(Z×X ′)
D(D(Z×X ′) )
Summary: A collateral Z is linked to our state X by joint distribution Π:D(Z×X ). This Π can
be decomposed into its right marginal pi:X on our state space, and a collateral channel Z:Z^X
between it and Z, i.e a right conditional of Π. (Right-conditionals are not necessarily unique; but
the variation on x’s where pi.x=0 does not affect D(Z·) at right (Lem. 11).
Although our abstract h at bottom can “see” only X and prior pi, it can have a collateral effect on Z,
given by the “Z-lifting” hZ shown at top. Note that hZ is not itself an abstract HMM.
Figure 3 Collateral correlation Π:D(Z×X ) lifts DX → D2(X×X ′) to D(Z×X )→ D2(Z×X ′).
Note that we re-order the set arguments of the D’s up to commutativity. Then we define
the “duplicator” ζ:Z×X → (Z×X )2 as ζ.(z, x) = (z, x, z, x), and conclude with h×Z being
hZ
2×X ◦ Dζ, which is of type D(Z×X )→ D2(Z×X )2 as required.
Our principal result (proved in App. F) is then
I Theorem 10. Let h1,2:DX → D2X 2. Then h1 v h2 iff h×Z1 v h×Z2 for every extension Z.
It is the only if of this theorem that shows the extended semantics DX → D2X 2 is enough
to allow Z-extension, i.e. that our semantics is compositional even in collateral contexts.
5.3 Justifying REFINEMENT DENIED due to collateral g-vulnerability
The definition in §5.1 of secure-program refinement v looks very strong, mandating a decrease
of g-vulnerability for all gain-functions g. Why is it not too strong?
A key result of [19] was that v is indeed not too strong in closed systems, provided one
accepts Bayes vulnerability as a reasonable security measure [26], and compositionality as reas-
onable property of program semantics.14 The argument was that if some general vulnerability
Vg, no matter how bizarre, mandates P 6vQ for two programs P,Q (i.e. REFINEMENT DENIED),
then there will be a context C and a prior pi such that for that pi the Bayes vulnerability of
C(P ), which is not bizarre at all, is strictly less than that of C(Q). In [19] the distinguishing
g was used to construct a Markov update Mg acting on P,Q’s final state, based on that g,
so that P ;Mg and Q;Mg were distinguished by the simpler Bayes vulnerability Vgid .
But our programs Lax,Strict from Fig. 1 are not distinguished by any g in a closed system:
only in an open system, with possible collateral variable Z, do we have Lax6vStrict. That
means the technique of [19] will not work here, because no g acting on X ′, the final state
14Compositionality is often expressed [[P ]]=[[Q]]⇒ [[C(P )]]=[[C(Q)]]; but when an (antisymmetric) refinement
order is available we refer to the stronger criterion of monotonicity of [[C(−)]] wrt. that order.
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alone, can distinguish the two programs: they produce the same hyper on X ′. (Recall †
in §5.1.) To make an analogous argument we instead use a collateral-aware g on X×X ′ to
construct a collateral correlation Πg between Z=W and X ; it is then the presence of the
induced collateral variable W that allows us to deny the refinement. We can then argue that
indeed Lax should not be refined by Strict, because in the presence of correlation Πg between
W and Z that refinement can be denied on the basis of Bayes vulnerability acting on W alone.
We give more details in App. G.
6 Related work; conclusions
Classical analyses of quantitative information flow assume that the secret does not change,
and early approaches to measuring insecurities in programs are based on determining a
“change in uncertainty” of some “prior” value of the secret — although how to measure the
uncertainty differs in approach. For example Clark et al [6] use Shannon entropy to estimate
the number of bits being leaked; and Clarkson et al [8] model a change in belief. The role of
capacity when the prior is not known was stressed by Chatzikokolakis et al [4]. Smith [26]
demonstrated the importance of using measures which have some operational significance,
and this idea was developed further [2] by introducing the notion of g-leakage to express
leakage wrt. very general contexts. The partial order used here on HMM ’s is the same as
the g-leakage order introduced by Alvim et al [2], but it also appeared in even earlier work
[19]. Its properties have been studied extensively [1].
More recently Marzdiel et al [18] have analysed information flow of dynamic secrets using
a model based on probabilistic automata. This reflects a view that in computing systems
secrets are not necessarily static; our work [19, 22] addresses this idea by providing semantic
domains for programs where secrets can change.
Clark et al [7] give techniques for static analysis of quantitative information flow based on
Shannon entropy for a small while-language. Extended HMM ’s for modelling side channels
have been explored by Karlof and Wagner [16] and Green et al [14] for e.g. key recovery. In
§4 our quantitative capacity bounds on side channels are valid even for collateral leakage.
The abstract treatment of probabilistic systems with the introduction of a “refinement
order” was originally due to Jones and Plotkin [15]; the ideas were extended to include
demonic nondeterminism (as well as probability) by us [25]. In both cases the order (on
programs) corresponds to an order determined by averaging over “probabilistic predicates”
which are random variables over the state space. The first compositional refinement order for
information flow appeared in [19] for security programs expressed in a simple programming
language and in [1] for a channel model of information flow.
Prospects and future work. In [22] we noted that collateral leakage has a significant
impact on abstract-program semantics for quantitative information flow; in this paper we
have defined a novel collateral-aware HMM -style model (Def. 8) that properly takes it into
account. The significance of the abstract models in this paper is that even though information
flow becomes apparent only in a wider context of collateral leakage, our abstract semantics
Def. 8 and Thm. 10 together show that programs can still be compared using only the
variables they actually declare in their source code.
An analogue of Thm. 10 for qualitative information flow appeared in Chen’s thesis [5]
where compositional refinement checking for two programs is reduced to comparisons involving
only the declared variables. The benefit of this theorem can be seen in Chen’s automation of
refinement checking for qualitative information flow. Our general result Thm. 10 holds out
the prospect of similar automation for quantitative-security refinement checking.
Bordenabe, McIver, Morgan and Rabehaja 13
References
1 Mário S. Alvim, Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Annabelle McIver, Carroll Morgan, Catus-
cia Palamidessi, and Geoffrey Smith. Additive and multiplicative notions of leakage, and
their capacities. In IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2014,
Vienna, Austria, 19-22 July, 2014, pages 308–322. IEEE, 2014.
2 Mário S. Alvim, Kostas Chatzikokolakis, Catuscia Palamidessi, and Geoffrey Smith. Meas-
uring information leakage using generalized gain functions. In Proc. 25th IEEE Computer
Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 2012), pages 265–279, June 2012.
3 Mário S. Alvim, Andre Scedrov, and Fred B. Schneider. When not all bits are equal:
Worth-based information flow. In Proc. 3rd Conference on Principles of Security and Trust
(POST 2014), pages 120–139, 2014.
4 Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Catuscia Palamidessi, and Prakash Panangaden. Anonymity
protocols as noisy channels. Inf. Comput., 206(2-4):378–401, 2008.
5 Chris Chen. Evincing practical and theoretical consequences of the Shadow Semantics,
October 2012. Undergraduate thesis, University of New South Wales.
www.cse.unsw.edu.au/∼carrrollm/CHEN 9945 shadow semantics.pdf.
6 David Clark, Sebastian Hunt, and Pasquale Malacaria. Quantitative analysis of the leakage
of confidential data. Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., 59(3):238–251, 2001.
7 David Clark, Sebastian Hunt, and Pasquale Malacaria. Quantified interference for a while
language. Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., 112:149–166, 2005.
8 Michael R. Clarkson, Andrew C. Myers, and Fred B. Schneider. Belief in information flow.
In 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, (CSFW-18 2005), 20-22 June
2005, Aix-en-Provence, France, pages 31–45, 2005.
9 T. Dalenius. Towards a methodology for statistical disclosure control. Statistik Tidskrift,
15:429–44, 1977.
10 E.W. Dijkstra. A Discipline of Programming. Prentice-Hall, 1976.
11 Cynthia Dwork. Differential privacy. In Proc. 33rd International Colloquium on Automata,
Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2006), pages 1–12, 2006.
12 Barbara Espinoza and Geoffrey Smith. Min-entropy as a resource. Information and Com-
putation (Special Issue on Information Security as a Resource), 226:57–75, April 2013.
13 M. Giry. A categorical approach to probability theory. In Categorical Aspects of Topology
and Analysis, volume 915 of Lecture Notes in Mathematics, pages 68–85. Springer, 1981.
14 P. J. Green, Richard Noad, and Nigel P. Smart. Further Hidden Markov model cryptana-
lysis. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2005, 7th International
Workshop, Edinburgh, UK, August 29 - September 1, 2005, Proceedings, pages 61–74, 2005.
15 C. Jones and G. Plotkin. A probabilistic powerdomain of evaluations. In Proceedings of the
IEEE 4th Annual Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, pages 186–95, Los Alamitos,
Calif., 1989. Computer Society Press.
16 Chris Karlof and David Wagner. Hidden Markov Model cryptanalysis. In Cryptographic
Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2003, 5th International Workshop, Cologne, Ger-
many, September 8-10, 2003, Proceedings, pages 17–34, 2003.
17 Arjen K. Lenstra, James P. Hughes, Maxime Augier, Thorsten Kleinjung, and Christophe
Wachter. Ron was wrong, Whit is right. Technical report, EPFL IC LACAL, Station 14,
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland, 2012.
18 Piotr Mardziel, Mário S. Alvim, Michael W. Hicks, and Michael R. Clarkson. Quantifying
information flow for dynamic secrets. In 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
SP 2014, Berkeley, CA, USA, May 18-21, 2014, pages 540–555, 2014.
19 Annabelle McIver, Larissa Meinicke, and Carroll Morgan. Compositional closure for Bayes
Risk in probabilistic noninterference. In Automata, Languages and Programming, 37th
14 Compositional security and collateral leakage
International Colloquium, ICALP 2010, Bordeaux, France, July 6-10, 2010, Proceedings,
Part II, pages 223–235, 2010.
20 Annabelle McIver, Larissa Meinicke, and Carroll Morgan. A Kantorovich-monadic power-
domain for information hiding, with probability and nondeterminism. In Proc. LiCS 2012,
2012.
21 Annabelle McIver, Larissa Meinicke, and Carroll Morgan. Hidden-Markov program algebra
with iteration. Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, 2014.
22 Annabelle McIver, Carroll Morgan, and Tahiry Rabehaja. Abstract Hidden Markov Models:
a monadic account of quantitative information flow. In Proc. LiCS 2015, 2015.
23 Annabelle McIver, Carroll Morgan, Geoffrey Smith, Barbara Espinoza, and Larissa Mein-
icke. Abstract channels and their robust information-leakage ordering. In Martín Abadi
and Steve Kremer, editors, Principles of Security and Trust - Third International Confer-
ence, POST 2014, Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice
of Software, ETAPS 2014, Grenoble, France, April 5-13, 2014, Proceedings, volume 8414
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 83–102. Springer, 2014.
24 C.C. Morgan. Programming from Specifications. Prentice-Hall, second edition, 1994.
web.comlab.ox.ac.uk/oucl/publications/books/PfS/.
25 C.C. Morgan, A.K. McIver, and K. Seidel. Probabilistic predicate transformers. ACM
Trans Prog Lang Sys, 18(3):325–53, May 1996.
doi.acm.org/10.1145/229542.229547.
26 Geoffrey Smith. On the foundations of quantitative information flow. In Luca de Alfaro,
editor, Proc. 12th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Com-
putational Structures (FoSSaCS ’09), volume 5504 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 288–302, 2009.
27 Geoffrey Smith. Connections between g-leakage and the Dalenius desideratum, December
2014. Presentation at Princess workshop meeting, Paris.
www.lix.polytechnique.fr/comete/Projects/Princess/workshops/quantitative-information-3/.
28 Colin D. Walter. MIST: an efficient, randomized exponentiation algorithm for resisting
power analysis. In Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2002, The Cryptographer’s Track at
the RSA Conference, 2002, San Jose, CA, USA, February 18-22, 2002, Proceedings, pages
53–66, 2002.
Bordenabe, McIver, Morgan and Rabehaja 15
A Summary of terms and notations
These entries list in first-use order the points at which notation is introduced during the
exposition: a detailed explanation of each is given there.
collateral leakage Leakage from data to which a program does not refer. p.1
X (Fig. 1) State space. p.2
[· · ·] (Fig. 1) Uniform distribution. p.2
:∈ (Fig. 1) Assignment made according to a distribution. p.2
leak (Fig. 1) Emit information from a program that an adversary can
observe; causes no change in the state of the program.
p.2
X+, X− (Fig. 1) Next, previous letter in a list. p.2
Lax,Strict (Fig. 1) Example password programs.. p.2
collateral variable variable affected by collateral leakage. p.3
abstract channel Denotation of channel that abstracts from leaked values. p.3
abstract HMM Denotation of HMM that abstracts from leaked values. p.3
X_Y Row-stochastic matrix. p.3
X^Y Column-stochastic (co-stochastic) matrix. p.3
Cx,y, Cx,−, C−,y Element, row, column of a matrix. p.3
D Discrete-distribution- or probability-measure type-constructor. p.4
pi〉C Joint distribution on Y×X formed by taking prior pi as input to
channel C.
p.4
[joint distribution] The hyper formed from a joint distribution. p.4
hyper-distribution Type D2; distributions of distributions. p.4
DX→D2X Type of abstract channel. p.4
vulnerability Quantitative measure of secret’s value. p.4
gain function Used to construct vulnerability functions. p.4
W Set from which gain-function’s choices are taken. p.4
Epi f Expected value of function f on distribution pi. p.4
g:GX Typical gain function and its type. p.4
gid The identity g-function, with W=X , giving Vgid as Bayes
vulnerability.
p.4
Vg:DX→R Vulnerability Vg induced by a gain function g, and its type. p.4
Bayes Vulnerability Greatest probability of guessing a secret on the first try. p.5
Bayes Risk One minus the Bayes Vulnerability. p.5
Lg etc. Multiplicative g-leakage, and various capacities. p.5
dot · Matrix multiplication. p.5
↼
pi,
⇒
Π left-marginal, right channel of joint distribution p.5
(C:M) HMM -step, a “primitive” HMM with channel C and markov M . p.6
markov (lc.) The Markov portion of an HMM -step. p.6
semicolon ; Sequential composition of HMM ’s as matrices. p.6
chn The effective channel of an HMM. p.6
‖ Parallel composition of channels. p.7
CCap Collateral-capacity estimate. p.7
ΥX The uniform distribution over X . p.7
extremal leakage An upper bound on leakage. p.7
[A@1/2,B@1/4,C@1/4] Discrete distribution with explicit probabilities. p.9
wprob with probability p.9
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v Security order on hypers. p.9
[[·]] Semantic function taking HMM matrices to abstract HMM ’s. p.10
pi〉H Joint distribution on X×Y×X ′ formed by taking prior pi as input
to hyper H.
p.10
DX→D2X 2 Type of abstract HMM, sometimes written DX→D2(X×X ′), with
X=X ′, to emphasise the different roles (initial,final) of the two X ’s.
p.10
abstract HMM Function in DX→D2(X×X ′) that is [[H]] for some H:X_Y×X ′. p.10
hZ Utility function for extending collateral-aware HMM ’s. p.10
(bold) semicolon ; Sequential composition of abstract HMM ’s. p.10
h×Z Collateral extension of abstract HMM to collateral variable Z. p.10
ζ “Duplicator” utility function used in the extension h×Z . p.10
ncX Degenerate channel on X that leaks nothing. p.25
idX Degenerate Markov transition on X that updates nothing. p.25
pure channel An HMM that (might) leak, but does not update the state. p.25
pure markov An HMM that (might) update the state, but does not leak. p.25
(:M) Abbreviation for (nc:M), a pure markov. p.25
(C:) Abbreviation for (C:id), a pure channel. p.25
◦ The sole element of the unit type {◦} emitted by a degenerate
channel.
p.18
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// Password X is initially uniformly distributed over X = {A, B, C}.
“Lax” user
X:∈ [A,B,C] ∗
leak [X+,X−] †
“Strict” user
X:∈ [X+,X−] $
leak [X+,X−] †
∗ [...] is the uniform distribution over ... ; and X:∈ assigns to X from a distribution.
$ X+ is the letter following X, and X− the preceding.
† leak [X+,X−] makes a (fair) choice secretly between X+ or X−, then emits the value somehow:
it does not however indicate whether it chose X+ or X−.
Note that the X referred to in the leak statement is the updated value, after the X:∈ .
Lax may choose any new password, uniformly, including his current; but Strict must change his
password, again uniformly. In both cases the distribution of the new X is again uniform: for Lax it is
independent of X’s initial value; but for Strict is is correlated.
Both users, in the second statement, suffer an “over the shoulder” attack against the new password.
Figure 4 Updating a password (repeat of Fig. 1)
B Detailed calculation of hypers for Fig. 1 [from §1, §5.1]
B.1 Elementary models
For convenience we repeat the programs of Fig. 1, in Fig. 4 here.
Variable X in the program text ranges over the state space X = {A, B, C}. We begin
by modelling its components in the simplest mathematical way, i.e. conventionally with
probabilistic updates being Markov matrices in X_X and leaks being channel matrices in
X_Y , where in this simple example Y=X . We then map those different descriptions into the
same framework of HMM -steps, their types becoming X → Y×X , for varying Y (sometimes
X itself, and sometimes the unit type {◦}); and finally we use their sequential compositions
to get the HMM descriptions of the two programs Lax and Strict.
The first statement X:∈ [A,B,C] of Lax corresponds to a Markov matrix in X_X with
the input at left and output at top:
ML1 :
A
A
1/3
B
1/3
C
1/3
B 1/3 1/3 1/3
C 1/3 1/3 1/3
 For Lax the input is ig-nored; the output is a
uniform choice over X .
However the first statement X:∈ [X+,X−] of Strict corresponds this Markov matrix instead:
MS1 :
A
A
0
B
1/2
C
1/2
B 1/2 0 1/2
C 1/2 1/2 0
 For Strict the output isa uniform choice over
anything but the input.
The second statement X:∈ [A,B,C] in both cases corresponds to a channel matrix in X_Y,
where in fact Y=X because the observables are of the same type as the state:
C2 :
A
A
0
B
1/2
C
1/2
B 1/2 0 1/2
C 1/2 1/2 0
 The over-the-shoulder leakis uniformly any value not
equal to the current state.
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B.2 Elementary models make HMM steps
To build the two programs from their components, we must convert those components to
HMM steps: note that although the components are all matrices, Markov matrices and
channels are converted in different ways. We start with the conversion of the markovs:
converted from X_X to the HMM -type X_Y×X they become
A
◦A
1/3
◦B
1/3
◦C
1/3
B 1/3 1/3 1/3
C 1/3 1/3 1/3
 A
◦A
0
◦B
1/2
◦C
1/2
B 1/2 0 1/2
C 1/2 1/2 0

where e.g. the label ◦A means the y, x′ pair (◦, A) — the observable is “unit”, the single
element of the unit type {◦}, and the new state is A because, these markovs’ being leak-free,
they (in effect) have no observables (equivalently, one always observes the same thing, the ◦,
so no information flows). 15
Conversion of the channel(s) does however leak information, giving in both cases 16

AA AB AC BA BB BC CA CB CC
A 0 0 0 1/2 0 0 1/2 0 0
B 0 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 0
C 0 0 1/2 0 0 1/2 0 0 0
 The columns are labelled with pairs (y, x
′),
so that e.g. from input A there are two
possible results: leak B and stay in state A,
or leak C and stay in state A.
B.3 Sequential composition of HMM-steps
To get the HMM representation of the two programs, we use the definition of HMM sequential
composition (2) in §3.1, which we repeat here for convenience:
(H1;H2)x,(y1,y2),x′ =
∑
x′′
H1x,y1,x′′H
2
x′′,y2,x′ . recalling (2) (4)
We have two versions of H1, one for each of Lax and Strict, and a single version of H2 that
applies to both. Type Y1 is the unit {◦}; and type Y2 is the same as X . Our composite
HMM (no longer simply an HMM -step) will have observables’ type Y=X , because we can
drop the unit type; 17 and its output type is still X . For Lax the result is this HMM, obtained
by applying (2) to Lax’s H1 and the common H2:

AA AB AC BA BB BC CA CB CC
A 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0
B 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0
C 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0
 For Lax the rows are identical, because theinput is ignored; the result is uniformly dis-tributed over outcomes in which the leaked
value and the new state are different.
For Strict the result is this HMM, this time using Strict’s H1 (and again the common H2):

AA AB AC BA BB BC CA CB CC
A 0 1/4 1/4 0 0 1/4 0 1/4 0
B 0 0 1/4 1/4 0 1/4 1/4 0 0
C 0 1/4 0 1/4 0 0 1/4 1/4 0
 For Strict the rows are not identical, be-cause the first HMM -step updates the state
in a way dependent on its incoming value.
15 In the notation of App. E they would be (:ML1) and (:MS1), both of HMM -type X_{◦}×X .
16 In the notation of App. E this would be (C2:) of HMM -type X_Y×X where, recall in fact Y=X
17The Cartesian product {◦}×Y is isomorphic to Y alone: we have HMM -composed X_{◦}×X and
X_Y×X to get X_({◦}×Y)×X , isomorphically X_Y×X .
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B.4 The semantic view: hypers for Lax
We are now interested in the hypers produced by each of the two HMM ’s just above when
they are applied to the uniform prior [A, B, C] that assigns probability 1/3 to each of A,B,C,
an assumption we have made for this example). We do Lax first: the joint distribution in
D(X×Y×X ′), where we are now referring to the final state with a prime, is obtained by
multiplying each row of the HMM by the corresponding prior probability (in this case 1/3 for
all of them), giving

AA AB AC BA BB BC CA CB CC
A 0 1/18 1/18 1/18 0 1/18 1/18 1/18 0
B 0 1/18 1/18 1/18 0 1/18 1/18 1/18 0
C 0 1/18 1/18 1/18 0 1/18 1/18 1/18 0
 To convert this to a hyper on X×X ′,we abstract from Y, the first compon-
ent of each column.
Because of the symmetry, to abstract from Y we can concentrate on just one observed
value, say A. In that case, the posterior in D(X×X ′) is [ [ AB, AC ], [ BB, BC ], [ CB, CC ] ], where
the first component is the row label x from just above, and the second component is the
second component of the column label x′ — the observation y=A has been abstracted. We
can write that more concisely in this case as the product [ A, B, C ]×[ B, C ] of two (uniform)
distributions, one in DX and the other in DX ′.
For observation B, analogously we get [ A, C ]×[ A, C ]; for observation C we get [ A, C ]×[ A, B ].
Since the observations (in this case) have equal (marginal) probabilities, the overall hyper in
D2(X×X ′) is uniform: it is
[ [ A, B, C ]×[ B, C ], [ A, B, C ]×[ A, C ], [ A, B, C ]×[ A, B ] ] . (5)
If we project (5) onto its second component we get a hyper in D2X ′ on the final state alone:
it is [ [ B, C ], [ A, C ], [ A, B ] ] , so that for Lax we will wprob 1/3 believe a-posteriori that x′ is
uniformly either B or C, when we observed A; for observations B,C resp. our posteriors in DX ′
alone are [ A, C ] and [ A, B ] resp.
If however we project onto the first component, we get posterior [ A, B, C ] in all three
cases: we have learned nothing about the initial value of x.
B.5 The semantic view: hypers for Strict
For Strict, sensitive to the initial state, the results are different. First, the joint distribution
in D(X×Y×X ′) is again obtained by multiplying the uniform prior through, giving now

AA AB AC BA BB BC CA CB CC
A 0 1/12 1/12 0 0 1/12 0 1/12 0
B 0 0 1/12 1/12 0 1/12 1/12 0 0
C 0 1/12 0 1/12 0 0 1/12 1/12 0

Again we concentrate on just one observation A, in which case, the posterior in D(X×X ′) is
[ AB, AC, BC, CB ].18 For observation B, analogously we get [ AC, BA, BC, CA ]; for observation C
we get [ AB, BA, CA, CB ]. Since the observations (again) have equal probabilities, the overall
hyper in D2(X×X ′) is again uniform:
[ [ AB, AC, BC, CB ], [ AC, BA, BC, CA ], [ AB, BA, CA, CB ] ] . (6)
18Take each of the non-zero entries under a column with left component A; retain only x and x′, dropping
the A; and, since all the probabilities are the same, form the uniform distribution on that.
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Now if we project this hyper, for Strict, onto its second component (the final state), we
get the same hyper in D2X ′ as for Lax just above. But if we project onto the first component
(the initial state), this time we get posterior
[ [ A, A, B, C ], [ A, B, B, C ], [ A, B, C, C ] ] , (7)
which we constructed just by erasing the second component of each pair in (6). The “uniform
distribution” with repeated components in the list gives proportionally more probability to
the repetitions: written in the conventional way, for (7) we would get
[ [ A@1/2, B@1/4, C@1/4 ], [ A@1/4, B@1/2, C@1/4 ], [ A@1/4, B@1/4, C@1/2 ] ] , (8)
which is indeed the same as (3) in §5.1 above.
B.6 The semantics of composition, and relative security
The above constructions started from Markov- and channel matrices, converted them into
HMM -step matrices, and then sequentially composed those matrices according to (4). The
semantic alternative is to take the denotations at the very beginning, i.e. the abstract HMM ’s
corresponding to the individual program fragments, and then to compose them according to
the semantic definition at Def. 8. The essential property [[H1;H2]] = [[H1]]; [[H2]] referred
to there ensures that the outcome would have been the same. Thus, either way, we can
summarise all the above by saying that Lax, as an abstract HMM, takes prior [ A, B, C ] to
hyper (5) which, when projected onto the initial component X is [ [ A, B, C ] ] — showing that
indeed Lax releases nothing about the initial state. The same procedure with Strict however
gives the initial-state hyper (8) which is strictly less secure than [ [ A, B, C ] ] in the hyper-order
v. This can be demonstrated even with Bayes Vulnerability Vgid , which is 1/3 for [ [ A, B, C ] ]
but 1/2 for (8) — but, more significantly, that strict-less-secure relation means that for any g
applying Vg to [ [ A, B, C ] ] will give no worse (i.e. no higher) vulnerability than applying it to
(8) or, equivalently, to (3).
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C Proofs for §3
Proof for Lem. 3 [from §3.2]
Let H be an HMM and (C:M) an HMM -step. Then
chn. (C:M) = C
chn. ((C:M);H) = C ‖ (M ·chn.H)
where in general (C1‖C2)x,(y1,y2) = C1x,y1C2x,y2 is parallel composition of channels. The M
cannot be discarded, since it affects the prior of the “tail” H of the sequential composition.
Proof. We prove each equality independently:
(chn.(C:M))x,y
=
∑
x′(C:M)x,y,x′ “Def. chn”
=
∑
x′ Cx,yMx,x′ “Def. HMM -matrix”
= Cx,y “M is stochastic”
(chn.((C:M);H))x,(y1,...,yn)
=
∑
x′((C:M);H)x,(y1,...,yn),x′ “Def. chn”
=
∑
x′
∑
x′′(C:M)x,y1,x′′Hx′′,(y2,...,yn),x′ “Def. (; )”
=
∑
x′
∑
x′′ Cx,y1Mx,x′′Hx′′,(y2,...,yn),x′ “Def. HMM -matrix”
= Cx,y1
∑
x′′Mx,x′′
∑
x′ Hx′′,(y2,...,yn),x′ “Move stuff around”
= Cx,y1
∑
x′′Mx,x′′(chn.H)x′′,(y2,...,yn) “Def. chn”
= Cx,y1(M · chn.H)x,(y2,...,yn) “Matrix multiplication”
= (C; (M · chn.H))x,(y1,y2,...,yn) . “Parallel composition”
J
Proof for Lem. 4 [from §3.2]
For any H let CCap.H be defined
CCap. (C:M) = L∀(∀, C) if H=(C:M)
CCap. ((C:M);H) = L∀(∀, C) + min(L∀(∀,M),CCap.H) . if H=(C:M);H ′
Then L∀(∀, chn.H) ≤ CCap.H where we interpret the stochastic matrix M (rhs) as a channel.
Proof. We use induction in the number of HMM -steps of H.
Base case: H has only one step.
L∀(∀, chn.(C:M))
= L∀(∀, C) “Def. chn”
= CCap. (C:M) . “Def. CCap”
Inductive step: assume the lemma is true for HMM ’s composed of n steps. Let H =
(C:M);H ′, where H ′ has n steps.
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L∀(∀, chn.((C:M);H ′))
= L∀(∀, C ‖ (M · chn.H ′)) “Def. chn”
= Lgid(ΥX , C ‖ (M · chn.H ′)) “[2, Thm. 5.1]”
≤ Lgid(ΥX , C) + Lgid(ΥX ,M · chn.H ′) “[12, Cor. 7]”
≤ Lgid(ΥX , C) + min(Lgid(ΥX ,M),Lgid(ΥX , chn.H ′)) “[12, Thm. 6]”
= Lgid(ΥX , C) + min(Lgid(ΥX ,M),L∀(∀, chn.H ′)) “[2, Thm. 5.1]”
≤ Lgid(ΥX , C) + min(Lgid(ΥX ,M),CCap.H ′) “Inductive hypothesis”
≤ L∀(∀, C) + min(L∀(∀,M),CCap.H ′) “monotonicity”
= CCap. ((C:M);H ′) . “Def. CCap”
J
Example showing that Lem. 4 can be conservative [from §3.2]
Consider the following program fragment.
// Prog: xs is initialised uniformly at random.
xs:= xs 1/3⊕ ¬xs ;
leak xs[0] 1/2⊕ xs[1] ;
xs:= xs 1/2⊕ ¬xs
Hidden variable xs is set initially uniformly at random over the four possible arrays of
length two having 0, 1 entries. Next the array values are all flipped (probability 2/3) or all
left alone (probability 1/3); afterwards the value of either the first or second bit is leaked,
but only the value is observed. Finally xs is updated again.
We model this as three HMM basic steps : H:= (:M1); (C2:); (:M2), whereM1 corresponds
to the first update of xs, C2 corresponds to the leak statement and M2 the last update of
xs. But from App. E we can combine the second and third, writing it as just the two steps
(:M1); (C2:M2). Applying Lem. 4 we find
CCap. H
= Lgid(ΥX , I) + min(Lgid(ΥX ,M1),CCap.((C2:M2)))
= min(Lgid(ΥX ,M1),Lgid(ΥX , C2)) . “Identity channel leaks nothing; Lem. 4”
We compute the values of the relevant matrices as follows:
M1:=

1/3 0 0 2/3
0 1/3 2/3 0
0 2/3 1/3 0
2/3 0 0 1/3
 C2:=

1 0
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
0 1

Finally we compute the leakages:
Lgid(ΥX ,M1) = lg((1/6 + 1/6 + 1/6 + 1/6) ∗ 4) = lg(8/3) = 1.415 ,
Lgid(ΥX , C2) = lg((1/4 + 1/4) ∗ 4) = lg(2) = 1 .
Hence CCap. H = 1.
However we can get an exact computation of leakage by calculating chn.H exactly via
Lem. 3, which gives L∀(∀, chn.H) = Lgid(ΥX ,M1 · C2) where
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M1 · C2:=

1/3 2/3
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
2/3 1/3

So finally we have L∀(∀, chn.H) = lg((1/6 + 1/6)4) = lg(4/3) = 0.415, which is consider-
ably less than CCap. H.
Proof for Thm. 5 [from §3.2]
Given H and Π:D(Z×X ) with ↼pi,⇀pi resp. the marginals of Π on Z,X , define conditional ⇒Π
as in §2.4, there exists gˆ:GZZ and gˆΠ:GZX such that
L∀(↼pi,
⇒
Π·chn.H) = Lgˆ(↼pi,
⇒
Π·chn.H) = LgˆΠ(⇀pi, chn.H) .
Proof. Let a:= minz:X ,↼piz>0
↼
piz, that is, a is the minimum non-zero probability in ↼pi. The
first equality follows from [1][Theorem 10], with gˆ.z′.z = a/↼piz, whenever z′ = z and ↼piz > 0,
and is zero otherwise.
We prove the second equality as follows. Let C:= chn.H and let
⇐
Π in X_Z be such that
Πz,x = ⇀pix
⇐
Πx,z. Next, given g:GWZ, define gΠ:GWX by gΠ.w.x =
∑
z:Z
⇐
Πx,zg.w.z .
We now reason as follows that Vg[↼pi〉
⇒
Π·C] = VgΠ [⇀pi〉C].
Vg[↼pi〉
⇒
Π·C]
=
∑
y:Y maxw:W
∑
z:Z
↼
piz(
⇒
Π · C)z,yg.w.z “Def. Vg”
=
∑
y:Y maxw:W
∑
z:Z
↼
piz(
∑
x:X
⇒
Πz,xCx,y)g.w.z “cascading”
=
∑
y:Y maxw:W
∑
z:Z,x:X (
↼
piz
⇒
Πz,x)Cx,yg.w.z “move stuff”
=
∑
y:Y maxw:W
∑
z:Z,x:X (
⇀
pix
⇐
Πx,z)Cx,yg.w.z “↼piz
⇒
Πz,x = Πz,x = ⇀pix
⇐
Πx,z”
=
∑
y:Y maxw:W
∑
x:X
⇀
pixCx,y(
∑
z:Z
⇐
Πx,zg.w.z) “move stuff”
=
∑
y:Y maxw:W
∑
x:X
⇀
pixCx,yg
Π.w.x “Def. gΠ”
= VgΠ [
⇀
pi〉C] . “Def. VgΠ”
The proof of Vg[↼pi] = VgΠ [
⇀
pi] is similar, implying that Lgˆ(↼pi,
⇒
Π · chn.H) = LgˆΠ(⇀pi, chn.H)
as required. J
Proof for Thm. 6 [from §3.2]
Given H and Π as above, we have
L∀(↼pi,
⇒
Π·chn.H) ≤ Lgid(ΥX , chn.H) ,
where ↼pi,
⇒
Π are as defined in Thm. 5, and ΥX is the uniform probability distribution over X .
Proof. It is enough to show the following:
L∀(↼pi,
⇒
Π·chn.H) ≤ L∀(⇀pi, chn.H) = Lgid(ΥX , chn.H)
The first inequality follows from the right capacity bound from [1, Cor 23]; the equality then
follows from [1, Thm 10]. J
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// B for base, the cleartext; E for exponent, the key: precondition is B,E >= 0,0 .
// P for power, the ciphertext.
P:= 1
while E!=0 // Invariant is P*(B^E) = be, where b, e are initial values of B,E .
D:∈ [2,3,5] // D for divisor; uniform choice from {2,3,5}.
R:= E mod D; // R for remainder.
if R!=0 then P:= P*B^R fi // Side-channel : is E divisible exactly by D ?
B:= B^D // D is small: assume no side-channel here.
E:= E div D // State update of E here. (No side-channel.)
end
// Now P=be and E=0: but what has an adversary learned about the initial e ?
Although our state comprises B,E,P,D,R we concentrate only on the secrecy of E. In particular, we are
not trying to discover B or P in this case; and D,R are of no external significance afterwards anyway.
Figure 5 Defence against side channel analysis in exponentiation: a repeat of Fig. 2
D An example: Obfuscated exponentiation [from §4]
In this section give the details of the leakage calculations for the example from §4. For
convenience we repeat the program at Fig. 5.
The well-known fast method of computing BE from a base B exponent E is a to employ a
“divide and conquer” method to avoid the exponential time taken to perform E multiplications.
But in the most straightforward implementations, side-channels can reveal whether the current
value of the exponent was decremented or divided by two, effectively revealing the exponent’s
bits one-by-one from least- to most significant. In cryptographic applications, this reveals
the secret key [28].
A defence against that is to vary unpredictably the divisor that decreases the exponent
on each iteration: not always 2, but say sometimes 3 and sometimes 5. This makes the
algorithm (slightly) less efficient but, in compensation, much complicates the side-channel
analysis that in the 2-case reveals everything. The code in Fig. 5 shows how: a fresh random
divisor D is chosen from a fixed set D, independently each time round the loop; in Fig. 5
we use D = {2, 3, 5}. (The original, insecure algorithm uses D={2}.) Since a higher divisor
offers more security, but takes longer to compute, the precise choice of D can be thought of
as selecting a trade-off between information leakage and performance.19
We assume that all variables are secret: for the example we assume the adversary seeks
the exponent E only, that is the secret key, not e.g. a particular message. His side-channel
is the if-statement: where he learns whether E is exactly divible by D; complicating his
analysis however is that he does not know exactly what D is on each occasion.
We model this as an HMM as follows. We represent the state as a tuple (B, E, P, D, R)
containing the values of each variable in the program. We can then model the statement
D:∈ [2, 3, 5] as a Markov update MD that uniformly assigns a fresh value to D while leaving
the rest of the variables untouched. That is, it maps each tuple (B, E, P, D, R) to a tuple
(B, E, P, D′, R) with probability 1/|D| for each D′ ∈ D. The assignment then following can be
modeled as a deterministic Markov MR, mapping (B, E, P, D, R) to (B, E, P, D, E mod D). We
19Walter [28] gives a nice summary of various issues offering tradeoffs between leakage and performance.
That algorithm is intended to provide more security by obfuscating further the pattern of if-branching.
For simplicity we do not do that full analysis here.
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assume pessimistically that the observer can learn whether or not the statement P := P ∗ BˆR
was executed, which logically is equivalent to observing the evaluation of the guard R! = 0 of
the if statement. We model this flow as a an HMM comprising a deterministic channel C
and a Markov MP . C outputs, for each state (B, E, P, D, R), whether R is 0 or not. The (also
deterministic) Markov part MP updates the state (B, E, P, D, R) to (B, E, PBR, D, R) only when
R6=0, otherwise the state remains unchanged. Finally, the last two assignments correspond
to deterministic Markov updates MB and ME , mapping a state (B, E, P, D, R) to (BD, E, P, D, R)
and (B, E div D, P, D, R) respectively.
We can express the program of Fig. 2 as an HMM built as the sequential composition
(:MD); (:MR); (C:MP ); (:MB); (:ME); (:MD); (:MR); (C:MP ); · · · ,
using the HMM -step notations from §3.1, whose good behaviour in representing our intentions
is justified in App. E.
However, the exact number of iterations depends on the initial value of E. To simplify the
analysis we will always assume a fixed number of iterations (equal to the minimum number
of iterations required for the program to yield the right result in every case). For instance,
if E can take values from 0 to 15 (4 bits), then the maximum number of iterations is 4: on
each iteration, E is divided at least by 2, and therefore after 4 iterations the value of E is
guaranteed to be 0. (“Extra iterations”, i.e. when E is already zero, have no effect.) Once
we have an HMM, say H, we can calculate chn.H using Lem. 3 and, once we have chn.H,
we can calculate its min-leakage. From Thm. 6, that gives also Dalenius leakage, which in
this case represents the leakage related to the initial value of E. Tbl. 1 shows the result of
computing this leakage for different sets of divisors.
E Some notations and properties of HMM steps [used in App. D]
In §3.1 it was remarked that the single, uniform definition of (;) for HMM ’s “essentially”
treats pure markovs and pure channels differently. That difference is possible because markovs
and channels are encoded differently within HMM ’s. First we give the details for classical
HMM ’s; then further below we address abstract HMM ’s. The degenerate channel that leaks
nothing about X can be regarded as having an anonymous singleton set as its observations, a
single-column matrix containing only 1’s. We write it ncX for “no channel” on state-space X ;
usually we omit the X . The degenerate markov that makes no change is the identity (matrix)
on X , which we write idX . We abbreviate (nc:M) by (:M) and (C:id) by (C:), calling them
(as HMM ’s) pure channels and pure markovs, and we note these properties of composition:
1. (C:); (:M) = (C:M) , i.e. that (C:M) is equivalent to “just C” and then “just M”.
2. (C1:); (C2:) = (C1‖C2:) where (C1‖C2)x,(y1,y2) defined C1x,y1C2x,y2 is the parallel compos-
ition of its constituents, i.e. that “C1 and then C2” is the same as C1 and C2 together
because C1 passes the state on, unchanged, to C2.
3. (:M1); (:M2) = (:M1·M2), where M1·M2 is the (usual) Markov composition of its
constituents, i.e. matrix multiplication.
The HMM -composition of pure channels and composition of pure markovs is what allows us
to combine channels and markovs and then treat them with the same definition of sequential
composition, as is done in App. D with one long (associative) sequential composition of
the loop body’s constituents, then unfolded as explained there to eliminate the loop: their
different purposes are automatically respected.
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The essential property referred to in Def. 8 of §5.2 guarantees that this same respect for
markovs’ difference from channels is achieved in the semantic domain as well. Using [21, 22]
this can be exploited to remain entirely in the semantic domain, including the loop explicitly
without having to unfold it.
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F Proofs and materials supporting §5
On “healthiness” of abstract HMM’s [from §5.2]
The denotations of our H’s in X_Y×X are functions in DX→D2(X×X ′); but not all
functions in that space are [[H]] for some H. The ones that are have been called abstract
HMM ’s, and they have properties that we use in the proofs below.
A common technique in semantics is to identify characteristic properties of denotations,
which can then lead to further insights. They are expressed in semantic terms, as we did
for example in [22, VIIA] for collateral-unaware abstract HMM ’s, calling them “healthiness
conditions”.20 An advantage of that is the possible discovery of more general properties that
secure computations’ (semantics) should have. Although we do not introduce collateral-aware
healthiness here, it is a clear target for future work.
Proofs of lemmas and theorems [from §5.2]
Lemma 11 shows that hZ in Fig. 3 is well defined whenever h=[[H]] for some H. The principal
fact is that possible variation in the choice of the right-conditional Z, at left, does not affect
the value produced by D(Z·) at right.
I Lemma 11. Let h be an abstract HMM; then hZ from Fig. 3 is well defined. [from §5.2]
Proof. Let h=[[H]] for some H:X_Y×X , and let Π be a joint distribution in D(Z×X ) with
right marginal pi:DX and Z:Z^X a right-conditional so that Π=Z 〈pi. If Z is unique, then
the result is trivial because hZ .Π is given by the composition of the bottom- and right-hand
arrows acting on pi in Fig. 3.
If however Z is not unique, it can only be at elements x where pix is 0, the well known
issue that the all-zero column Π−,x cannot be normalised: but equally well known is that
“it doesn’t matter” because any arbitrary value chosen for Z−,x will be multiplied by 0 in
Π=Z 〈pi.
It doesn’t matter on the right, either, because a property of abstract h’s inherited from
their originating H’s is that if pi.x=0 then the sub-vector (pi〉H)x,−,− of the joint distribution
pi〉H is all zero; that means, in turn, that in all inners δ of the hyper [pi〉H] derived from that
joint distribution (by abstracting from y) the probability δx,x′ for that x, and for for any x′,
will be zero as well. Thus, again, variation of Z at that x does not matter.
In all cases,
hZ .Π = D(Z·).(h.pi) (9)
holds whenever Π=Z 〈pi. J
20A conspicuous example of this is Dijkstra’s healthiness conditions for predicate transformers on sequential
programs: the principal one was conjunctivity. Originally [10] Dijkstra proved by structural induction
over program texts that all program denotations were healthy; later researchers instead used healthiness
to characterise a subspace of predicate transformers, and then proved that all programs’ denotations
lay within it — the same proof, but a different point of view. That more semantic view allowed later
the expansion of healthiness, to include e.g. miracles and angelic choice, which in turn lead to new
programming-language features that could denote the members of the expanded set.
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Proof for Thm. 10 [from §5.2]
Since h×Z = hZ2×X ◦Dζ, it suffices to prove the following result.
I Theorem 12. Let h1,2 be two abstract HMM’s. Then h1 v h2 iff h1Z v h2Z for all
extension Z.
Proof. Let us assume that h1 v h2 and let Π:D(Z×X ) with a right-conditional Z and right
marginal pi, i.e. Z 〈pi = Π. Let ∆i = hi.pi for i = 1, 2. Recall from [20, Def. 6] that two
hypers satisfy ∆1v∆2 in D2X 2 iff there exists a super Γ:D3X 2 such that ∆1 = µDX 2 .Γ
(the outer average) and ∆2 = DµX 2 .Γ (the inner average) 21. We say that Γ witnesses the
refinement ∆1v∆2. Let us show that the super D2(Z·).Γ:D3(Z×X ) witnesses the refinement
D(Z·).∆1 v D(Z·).∆2 in D(Z×X ), i.e.
D(Z·).∆1 = µD(Z×X ).
(
D2(Z·).Γ) and D(Z·).∆2 = DµZ×X . (D2(Z·).Γ) .
Both equalities can be stated using the diagrams given in Fig. 6-(a,b). Let us show that
these diagrams indeed commute.
D2X 2 D2(Z×X )
D3X 2 D3(Z×X )
D(Z·)
D2(Z·)
DµX2 Dµ(Z×X)
(a)
D2X 2 D2(Z×X )
D3X 2 D3(Z×X )
D(Z·)
D2(Z·)
µDX2 µD(Z×X)
(b)
DX 2 D(Z×X )
D2X 2 D2(Z×X )
(Z·)
D(Z·)
µX2 µZ×X
(c)
Figure 6 The multiplication (Z·) commutes with inner (Dµ) and outer (µD) averages.
For the diagram in Fig. 6-(a)(inner-average), it suffices to show Fig. 6-(c) commutes
because D-lifting preserves commutative diagrams. This essentially follows from the linearity
of (Z·). Let us first recall the definition of multiplication in the Giry monad. Given a (polish)
space S and a Borel set O⊆S, the multiplication µS is defined by the expected value of the
evaluation function O:DS→R where O.δ = δ.O for every δ:DS. We have, for every ∆:D2S,
(µS .∆).O =
∫
Od∆ . (10)
We simply write s when O is the singleton {s}. Recall also that given a measurable function
f :R→S, the push-forward of f by D is Df :DR→DS where, for every Borel set O⊆S and
measure δ:DR, we have
Df.δ.O = δ.(f−1.O) = δ.{r | f(r)∈O} . (11)
A very useful result links the constructor D with integrals. Let f :R→S and g:S→R be
measurable functions and δ:DR be a Borel measure. We know that Df.δ∈DS so we can
integrate g wrt it. In fact, Giry has proven in [13, Sec. 3 p.70] that∫
gdDf.δ =
∫
g◦fdδ . (12)
21Here, (D, µ, [−]) is the usual Giry monad, see [13, 20, 22].
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We are now ready to prove that all diagrams in Fig. 6 commute. For Fig. 6-(c), let ∆:D2X 2
be an arbitrary hyper and (z, x′):Z×X . On the one hand,
(µZ×X ◦D(Z·).∆)z,x′
=
∫
(z,x′)dD(Z·).∆ “Eqn. (10)”
=
∫
(z,x′)◦(Z·)d∆ “Eqn. (12)”
On the other hand, we have
(Z·(µX 2 .∆))z,x′
=
∑
x Zz,x(µX 2 .∆)x,x′ “Def. matrix multiplication”
=
∑
x Zz,x
∫
(x,x′)d∆ “Eqn. (10)”
=
∫ ∑
x Zz,x(x,x′)d∆ “Integration is linear”
Thus, it remains to show that the integrands in the last lines of the reasoning above are the
same. Let δ:DX 2, we have
(
(z,x′)◦(Z·)
)
.δ = (Z·δ)z,x′ =
∑
x
Zz,xδx,x′ =
(∑
x
Zz,x(x,x′)
)
.δ
Hence, Fig. 6-(c) commutes and its D-lift gives the inner-average commutative diagram.
We now prove that Fig. 6-(b) (outer-average) commutes. Let Γ:D3X 2 and O be a Borel
subset of D2(Z×X ). On the one hand, we have(
µD(Z×X )◦D2(Z·)
)
.Γ.O(
µD(Z×X ).
(
D2(Z·).Γ)) .O “Def. (◦)”
=
∫
OdD2(Z·).Γ “Eqn. (10)”
=
∫
O◦D(Z·)dΓ “Eqn. (12)”
On the other hand, we have
(D(Z·)◦µDX 2) .Γ.O
= D(Z·).(µDX 2 .Γ).O “Def. (◦)”
= (µDX 2 .Γ).((Z·)−1.O) “Def. push-forward (11)”
=
∫
(Z·)−1.OdΓ “Eqn. (10)”
As before, it remains to show that the integrands are equal. For every hyper ∆:DX 2, we
have
(O◦D(Z·)) .∆
= O.(D(Z·).∆) “Def. (◦)”
= D(Z·).∆.O “Def. ”
= ∆.((Z·)−1.O) “Def. push-forward (11)”
= (Z·)−1.O.∆ “Def. ”
This concludes that Fig. 6-(b) commutes.
Conversely, assume h1Zvh2Z for every extension Z. For Z = X , we have h1Xvh2X . Let
pi:DX and Π:DX 2 such that Π has pi on the diagonal and 0 anywhere else. It follows from
Equation (9) that hi.pi = hiX .Π and thus h1vh2. J
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Proof that [[−]] preserves sequential composition [from §5.2]
I Lemma 13. Let H1,2 be HMM matrices. We have [[H1;H2]] = [[H1]];[[H2]]X .
Proof. Let pi:DX be a prior. On the one hand, let y1,2 be observations associated to the
inner δ in [[H1;H2]].pi. That is, for pair x, x′∈X of initial and final value:
δx,x′ =
pix(H1;H2)x,(y1,y2),x′
NH1;H2,pi,(y1,y2)
where the normalisation constant is defined as in §2.1:
NH,pi,y =
∑
x,x′
pixHx,y,x′ . (13)
On the other hand, let us have a look at the inners of [[H1]];[[H2]]X .pi. Let one such inner be
δ:D(X×X ′). By Equation (9), we have [[H2]]X .γ = D(Z·).[[H2]].⇀γ where the right-conditional
and right marginal satisfy Z 〈⇀γ = γ. Therefore, there exists some inner γ:D(X×X ′) of
[[H1]].pi such that δ = Z·ρ for some inner ρ:DX×X ′ of [[H2]].⇀γ and Z 〈⇀γ = γ. Thus
γx,u =
pixH
1
x,y1,u
NH1,pi,y1
and ρu,x′ =
⇀γ uH
2
u,y2,x′
NH2,⇀γ ,y2
for some observations y1,2. Hence
δx,x′
= (Z·ρ)x,x′ “δ = Z·ρ”
=
∑
u Zx,uρu,x′ “Def. Z·”
=
∑
u Zx,u
⇀γ uH
2
u,y2,x′
NH2,⇀γ ,y2
“Def. of ρ above”
=
∑
u γx,u
H2
u,y2,x′
NH2,⇀γ ,y2
“Z 〈⇀γ = γ”
=
∑
u
pixH
1
x,y1,u
NH1,pi,y1
H2
u,y2,x′
NH2,⇀γ ,y2
“Def. of γ above”
= pix(H
1;H2)x,(y1,y2),x′
NH1,pi,y1NH2,⇀γ ,y2
“Def. H1;H2”
It remains to prove that NH1;H2,pi,(y1,y2) = NH1,pi,y1NH2,⇀γ ,y2 (this essentially tells us that
it does not matter whether we apply the normalisation process for each component in
the sequential composition or we leave it until the end and just carry out normal HMM
multiplication at the matrix level).
NH1,pi,y1NH2,⇀γ ,y2
=
∑
u,x′
⇀γ uH
2
u,y2,x′NH1,pi,y1 “Def. NH2,⇀γ ,y′”
=
∑
u,x′
∑
x γx,uH
2
u,y2,x′NH1,pi,y1 “
⇀γ u =
∑
x
γx,u”
=
∑
u,x′
∑
x
pixH
1
x,y1,u
NH1,pi,y1
H2u,y2,x′NH1,pi,y1 “Substituting γx,u”
=
∑
u,x′
∑
x pixH
1
x,y1,uH
2
u,y2,x′ “Simplification with NH1,pi,y1 (†)”
=
∑
x,x′ pix
∑
uH
1
x,y1,uH
2
u,y2,x′ “Arith.”
=
∑
x,x′ pix(H1;H2)x,y2,x′ “Def. (H1;H2)x,(y1,y2),x′”
= N(H1;H2),pi,(y1,y2) . “Def. of N(H1;H2),pi,(y1,y2)”
(†) This step assumes the normalising constant NH1,pi,y1 is not zero. If it is zero, then the
equality we want to prove clearly holds.
Hence, [[H1;H2]].pi and ([[H1]];[[H2]]).pi have the exact same inners associated to the same
respective outer probabilities. J
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Proof that sequential composition [from §5.2]
respects behavioural equivalence
I Theorem 14. If H v H ′ and K v K ′ then H;K v H ′;K ′.
Let us firstly prove a very important property of HMM s: they transform gain functions.
We construct, for every g:GWX 2, a gain function gH :GY→WX 2 where
gH .σ.(x, x′) =
∑
y,u
g.(σ.y).(x, u)Hx′,y,u , (14)
for every strategy σ:Y → W and x, x0∈X . We have the following properties of gH .
I Lemma 15. Let H,K be HMMs and pi:DX be a prior. For every gain function g:GY→Y→WX 2,
we have:
1. Vg[pi〉H] = VgH [pi],
2. gH;K = (gH)K .
Proof. For 1., we have∑
y maxw:W
∑
x,x′ g.w.(x, x′)Hx,y,x′pix “Def. Vg[pi〉H]”
= maxσ:Y→W
∑
y
∑
x,x′ g.(σ.y).(x, x′)Hx,y,x′pix “Swap max and
∑
y
”
= maxσ:Y→W
∑
x g
H .σ.(x, x)pix “Def. gH”
= VgH [pi] “Def. Vg[pi]”
For 2., let σ:Y → Y →W. We have
(gK)H .σ.(x, x′)
=
∑
y,u g
K .(σ.y).(x, u)Hx′,y,u “Def. gH”
=
∑
y,u
∑
y′,v g.(σ.y.y′).(x, v)Ku,y,vHx′,y,u “Def. gK”
=
∑
y
∑
y′,v g.(σ.y.y′).(x, v)
∑
uHx′,y,uKu,y,v “Swap sums”
=
∑
y,y′
∑
v g.(σ.y.y′).(x, v)(H;K)x′,(y,y′),v “Def. H;K”
= gH;K .σ.(x, x′) “Def. gH;K”
as required. J
Now, we can prove Thm. 14.
Proof of Thm. 14. Let H v H ′, K v K ′, g be a gain function and pi:DX be a prior. On
the one hand, assume H v H ′ and let us show that H;K v H ′;K.
Vg[pi〉(H;K)]
= VgH;K [pi] “Lem. 15.1”
= V(gK)H [pi] “Lem. 15.2”
= VgK [pi〉H] “Lem. 15.1”
≥ VgK [pi〉H ′] “H v H ′”
= Vg[pi〉(H ′;K)] “Lem. 15.1 and Lem. 15.2”
On the other hand, assume K v K ′ and let us show that H ′;K v H ′;K ′. For each
observation y of H ′, we consider the associated inner δy:DX 2 and outer py: [0, 1] where
(δy)x,x′ =
pixH
′
x,y,x′
NH′,y,pi
where NH′,y,pi =
∑
x,x′ pixH
′
x,y,x′ is the usual column normalising constant. Then
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Vg[pi〉(H ′;K)]
=
∑
y p
yVg[δy 〉K] “Def. δy’s”
≥ ∑y pyVg[δy 〉K ′] “K v K′”
= Vg[pi〉(H ′;K ′)] “Def. δy’s”
Hence, H;K v H ′;K ′ follows by transitivity of v. J
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G Reduction to Bayes vulnerability via a collateral context [from §5.3]
In §5.3 we asked whether the refinement relation v from §5.1 was too strong, and recalled
that in [19] a construction was given that reduced refinement to Bayes vulnerability, at
least for closed systems without collateral correlations: if P 6vQ then there was a context
“post-compose with program R” and a prior pi such that the two hypers
∆P = [[P ;R]].pi and ∆Q = [[Q;R]].pi
had Bayes vulnerabilities in particular “the wrong way around”, i.e. that Vgid(∆P ) < Vgid(∆Q).
That justified the failure of refinement, for if PvQ then we cannot, for any prior and R,
have that Q;R is more Bayes vulnerable than P ;R.
That argument does not however work directly for refinements that are rejected because
of collateral correlations: the post-composing R does not have access to the initial states of
P,Q if those programs modify the state. A very direct (and somewhat brutal) work-around
would be to re-use the construction of [19] by putting P,Q into a context that preserved the
input by first copying it into Z say, then executing P,Q resp. and finally introducing an R
as before but one that operated not on X directly but rather on the preserved copy held in
Z. Because neither of P,Q assign to Z, it would still contain X’s original value; but leaks in
P,Q from X would be reflected in different hypers D2(Z×X ) resulting from each. That is,
informally we would have a collateral context containing declaration var Z:X and the code
Z := X; P ; RZ and Z := X; Q; RZ ,
where RZ is the distinguishing R from [19] but operating on Z instead of X.
A more convincing approach however is to use the gain function g that distinguishes P,Q
to make a “pre” collateral correlation Πg instead of a “post” assignment Rg. It has been
shown that the Πg can be derived from the Rg; but a more direct route is the following.
Assume the programs P,Q are indistinguishable wrt. the hypers on their final states
(else we could simply appeal to [19]), but that they differ wrt. their information-flow effect
on the initial state. Using chn from Lem. 3 in §3.2, take chn.P and chn.Q, the effective
channels of P,Q resp. and let ∆P ,∆Q resp. be the hypers resulting from the action of
those channels respectively on the prior pi. By assumption ∆P 6v∆Q, and so there is some
gain-function g with Vg(∆P ) < Vg(∆Q). It is shown in [27], but considering only channels
(not HMM -programs), that there is indeed a collateral correlation Πg:D(W×X ) such that
Vgid [Πg · chn.P ] < Vgid [Πg · chn.Q] ,
where [Πg · chn.P ] is the hyper resulting from the joint distribution in D(W×Y) formed by
the matrix multiplication of the joint distribution Πg by the stochastic chn.P .
Thus we have shown that if the g-vulnerabilities of chn.P and chn.Q wrt. some g:W→X→R
and pi:DX mandate P 6vQ, then the collateral Bayes vulnerabilities of P,Q are the wrong
way around for some collateral correlation Πg (whose right-marginal is of course pi); gen-
eral g-discsimination is again, as in [19], reduced to Bayes-vulnerability discrimination and
compositionality.
